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The purpose of this paper is to test empirically the relationship between two important concepts: 
disclosure and liquidity. Using a sample of Spanish quoted firms between 1994 and 2000 we show 
that the estimation of the relationship between disclosure and liquidity depends crucially on two 
factors: a) the multidimensionality of the concept of liquidity; b) the use of an econometric 
methodology that deals properly with the features of the sample used. However the use of the 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure provides evidence in favour of a positive relationship between 
disclosure and liquidity. 
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The level of transparency of companies’ annual reports has become a central 
theme of debate in recent years. On both sides of the Atlantic, companies that 
seemed perfectly healthy from a financial point of view suddenly had to announce 
that were experiencing solvency problems and in few months or weeks had 
collapsed. These major bankruptcies called into question the usefulness of annual 
reports as an information source for investment decisions. 
 
These doubts on the relevance of accounting information for stock valuation are 
not new. Already Lev (1989) questioned the usefulness of earnings as value 
relevant information in a stock market. 
 
However the recent debate has shifted the focus of attention from the usefulness 
of “accounting numbers” to the importance of “transparency” on issues regarding 
company life. The public reaction to the scandals has obviously called into 
question existing accounting standards on issues that are quantifiable and may 
enter directly company accounts. But it has also raised the question of how much 
information companies should provide on non quantifiable issues regarding 
corporate governance (composition of the board, connections with other 
companies, etc…) or on quantifiable issues that may not enter directly company 
accounts (risk evaluation, market forecasts, etc…). 
 
This is the reason why it is critical to increase our understanding of how 
transparency of companies’ annual reports affects, for example, volatility, 
expected returns or liquidity. 
 
Using a database of companies that quote on the Madrid Stock Exchange (MSE, 
hereafter), we want to study if a different level of disclosure quality in the annual 
report has an effect on the liquidity of the company stock.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we 
review the relevant related literature and we present our hypothesis and the 
novelty of our analysis. In section 3 we summarize the sample selection procedure 
and the variables we will use in our study. Section 4 presents our empirical 
results. Finally, section 5 provides some conclusions.  
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
The possible effects of quantity and quality of disclosure on the stock market 
behaviour have been studied fairly extensively, both from a theoretical and from 
an empirical point of view. 
 
From a theoretical point of view Dye (2001) pointed out that there exist two main 
strands in the disclosure literature: mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure.  
 
Mandatory (or exogenous) disclosure models are usually set up as extensions of 
general equilibrium asset pricing model. Suppose for simplicity that there exists 
only one risky asset. Risk-averse traders receive some information (disclosure) 
about the value of the risky asset and afterwards are allowed to trade. Verrecchia 
(2001) calls these models “association-based disclosure models” and provides a 
comprehensive survey of those that have appeared in the accounting literature. 
While trying to theoretically found the existence of a relationship between 
disclosure and liquidity, “association-based disclosure models” seem to be the 
natural candidates because they clearly derive mathematical relations between 
disclosure and price and/or volume. 
 
The reason why public disclosure can be a crucial determinant of liquidity in these 
models is fairly intuitive. The intuition was already implicit in the original model 
by Kyle (1985) or Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In these models, liquidity is 
negatively related to the level of adverse selection present in the market. The more 
likely it is that there exist traders in the market that have an informational 
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advantage over the rest of the traders the less liquid is the market. This reduction 
of liquidity can be observed in higher level of spreads (Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985) or lower amount of depth (Kyle, 1985). 
 
More public information known by the agents that interact in the market may 
imply lower adverse selection and hence, higher liquidity. Consequently it is 
natural to extend this analysis by studying the effect that public disclosure can 
have over the level of adverse selection and liquidity in the market. If more 
transparency implies lower level of adverse selection, then we expect to find a 
positive relationship between disclosure and liquidity. This can be stated in the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1(a): Higher levels of quality of the information disclosed by a company annual 
report implies higher levels of liquidity of its stocks. 
 
However, it has to be pointed out that there exist theoretical models that provide a 
rationale for the opposite result to hold. According to Kim and Verrecchia (1994), 
if public announcements are interpreted differently by different traders, then it is 
possible that information asymmetry increases after the announcement has taken 
place. This is because sophisticated investors may learn more from the public 
announcement than unsophisticated investors. If this is the case, then disclosure 
actually decreases market liquidity. Hence we can state the following alternative 
hypothesis: 
 
H1(b): Higher levels of quality of the information disclosed by a company annual 
report implies lower levels of liquidity of its stocks. 
 
Turning our attention to the second strand of literature, we can describe the 
theoretical literature on voluntary (endogenous) disclosure as a natural extension 
of the asymmetric information models. Assuming that information about the stock 
is imperfect and/or incomplete, then any “disclosure” made by an informed 
party(s) (the firm) to some other less informed party(s) (the investors) may affect 
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the amount of information asymmetry and as a consequence on some relevant 
variables like volatility or liquidity. 
 
The original unravelling result of, for example, Milgrom (1981) tells us that no 
value relevant information can be successfully withheld in equilibrium. This 
prediction seems to go against the observation that in real life companies do 
manage to hide information to the market. This is the reason why voluntary 
disclosure models have tried to explain why we have only partial disclosure in 
equilibrium instead of full disclosure. However the basic intuition of the original 
unravelling result is still valid in most of the following models: companies that are 
convinced that they have some good news have an incentive to voluntarily 
disclose them. If they do not do it, it is because there are some other elements that 
prevent them (e.g. some cost of disclosure that outweighs its benefit). 
 
Voluntary disclosure models do not study directly the effect of disclosure on 
liquidity. They usually focus on the effects on information revelation on the 
valuation of a company and predict that higher transparency should be correlated 
with a higher equilibrium price or with a lower cost of equity capital.3 The reason 
behind the result is similar to the one presented for the mandatory disclosure 
models: public disclosure reduces the level of adverse selection in the market. 
Hence if liquidity is an inverse function of adverse selection, then voluntary 
disclosures should increase market liquidity. Hence the voluntary disclosure 
literature provides theoretical support to a positive relationship between disclosure 
and liquidity (i.e. to hypothesis H1(a)) 
 
As we can see, both in the mandatory case and in the voluntary case the effect of 
disclosure on liquidity is never a direct one. It always goes through the effect of 
disclosure on the level of adverse selection, which is difficult to measure 
empirically.  
                                                 
3 However Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) shows that the relationship may be more complicated 
if various communication channels can be used. 
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 Another important issue to take into account is the trading mechanism operating 
in markets. We can distinguish between “driven by order” markets and “driven by 
prices” markets. The main difference between them is the existence or not of 
market makers doing transactions by their own account. Driven by orders 
markets, like the Spanish one, can be formally described by the ideal electronic 
open limit order book framework proposed by Glosten (1994). This author 
presents a theoretical model of price revisions due to the information conveyed by 
trading throughout the limit order book mechanism. This is the framework in 
which the relationship between disclosure and liquidity is estimated. According to 
Glosten’s model, liquidity measures are direct measures of adverse selection4. 
 
Lee et al. (1993) provide evidence on the bi-dimensional character of liquidity as 
a concept. Spread and depth do not measure the same aspect of liquidity. Hence 
an analysis that only considers one of the liquidity dimensions may be biased, 
because results depend on the variable used to measure liquidity. More generally, 
it is important to highlight that in order to asses the impact of information 
decisions on liquidity we should consider simultaneously immediacy costs 
(spreads), depth and variables that are considered good proxies of liquidity. This 
is the reason why we are going to measure liquidity using four different proxies. If 
multidimensionality is relevant, then the results should depend on the liquidity 
measures used. We state this in the following hypothesis 
 
H2: The effect on liquidity of the quality of the information disclosed by a 
company annual report, depends on the liquidity measures considered. 
 
                                                 
4 We are not going to estimate directly the level of adverse selection characterizing the stocks 
object of our analysis. As Van Ness et al. (2001) show, the results related to the level of adverse 
selection of an asset depend very much on the model used to estimate it. Moreover, these authors 
compare the adverse selection measures and the spread with several volatility measures. Their 
results show that spread contains an important part of the adverse selection and that it is related to 
volatility. 
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Four previous studies are directly related to ours: Welker (1995), Healy, et al. 
(1999), Heflin, et al. (2002) and Leuz and Verrechia (2000).  
 
Welker (1995), Healy, et al. (1999) and Heflin, et al. (2002) all work with US data 
and use the Association for Investment and Management Research (AIMR) score 
to measure disclosure.  
 
Welker (1995) uses a panel of data including those companies that have an AIMR 
disclosure score for the years 1983 to 1990. He finds that disclosure has a positive 
effect on liquidity. While he correct for the possible endogenous nature of the 
disclosure variable, he does not correct for any possible time or company 
dependence generated by the type of data (panel) used. Moreover he only uses the 
relative bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity. In our study we are going to use 
proper panel data estimation techniques and to apply them to four alternative 
measures of liquidity.  
 
Healy, et al. (1999) start from a similar set of data, i.e. companies with an AIMR 
score for the years 1980 to 1990, but investigate the effect of “substantial” 
increases in disclosure levels. Hence they include as observations in their 
estimations only the maximum increases in the disclosure score for each of the 
company in the sample, no matter in which year it has taken place. They find that 
a substantial increase in disclosure has a positive effect on liquidity.Their sample 
selection procedure delivers a fairly small sample (97 observations) and restricts 
the analysis to a specific aspect of the disclosure, i.e. substantial increase in 
disclosure. Moreover, as Welker (1995) they use only the relative bid-ask spread 
as their liquidity measure. We believe that a more general analysis of the effect of 
disclosure levels on liquidity levels is still worth pursuing through the use of a 
panel of data. 
 
Heflin, et al. (2002) use only one year of AIMR data (1988) and considers both 
effective spread and depth. They find that firms with higher quality disclosures 
have lower effective bid-ask spreads but lower quoted depths. To investigate the 
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nature of this effect, they estimate information asymmetry spread components 
within different levels of trade size (scaled by depth). Their main result is that 
firms with high disclosure quality exhibit less likelihood of informed trading, even 
when trade size is close to the quoted depth. As a consequence, they show that 
higher quality disclosures policy reduces the risk of informed trading and 
enhances market liquidity. The work by Heflin et al. (2002) is the only one so far, 
that has explicitly dealt with the multidimensionality problem of liquidity. 
However the fact of using only one year of data leaves out the possibility of 
taking into account the possible time dependence of liquidity for a certain 
company. The use of a full panel of data for 7 years will allow us to take this 
aspect into account. Moreover we introduce the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure that represents the price impact when trade volume is normalised to one 
euro. The results regarding this measure can be seen as a parsimonious way of 
reconciling the potentially contrasting results regarding spread and depth.  
 
Finally, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examine bid-ask spreads for German firms 
that choose to adopt an higher level of disclosure, i.e. that adopt IAS or US 
accounting standards. They find that these firms have lower bid-ask spreads than 
firms that adopt a lower level of disclosure, i.e. that adopt German accounting 
standards. However, similar top Heflin et al. (2002), they restrict their analysis to 
the 1998 reporting choice. Moreover the dichotomous nature of their disclosure 
variable prevents from studying the effects of more than two levels of disclosures.  
 
In summary, even if these are already important results, we believe that there are 
some good reasons to investigate further the relationship between disclosure and 
liquidity empirically. In particular we believe that study of the relationship 
between disclosure for a full panel of data, considering various alternative 
measures of liquidity and using proper panel data estimation technique is still 
lacking. The aim of this paper is to provide this analysis as the basis to test the 
hypothesis presented before. 
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3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
 
Our initial sample is made of all the companies that quote on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange (MSE) between 1994 and 2000 and for which we have a measure of the 
quality of disclosure in their annual report. From this initial sample we only 
consider those firms for which we have liquidity measures and returns. The final 
size of our sample depend on the liquidity measures used and ranges from 658 
firm-year observations to 704 firm-year observations.  
 
3.1 Proxy for disclosure 
 
Our measure of disclosure quality is taken from a business magazine (“Actualidad 
Económica”). This magazine publishes each year a ranking of the annual reports 
of the companies that trade on the Spanish continuous market. 
 
A pool of experts grades several aspects of the information contained in the 
annual report. These grades are added up in order to produce a score that measures 
the quality of the information provided. Contrary to the AIMR score used in the 
previous US based studies, in the Spanish case the pool of experts is the same for 
all the companies considered. This guarantees consistency across industries. 
 
Among the items considered we find: historical data, analytical account of results, 
composition of shareholding, shares percentage held by the board of directors, 
order and clarity of the report, design, number of branches, directors' 
remuneration, returns on shares, market evolution, review of operations, on-line 
information5. 
 
                                                 
5 The full list of items is provided in the appendix. 
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A score is given for each one of these items of the annual report. With these 
scores we have created a disclosure index based on the sum of scores obtained 
divided by the maximum sum of scores obtainable. For example, CEPSA in 2000 
was given a total score of 54, and as the maximum available was 100 points, the 
index of quality of disclosure takes the total value 0.54.  
 
3.2 Liquidity measures 
 
We use various liquidity measures. The main reason to study the effects on 
different liquidity measure is to capture the bidimensionality problem. The first 
paper that deals empirically with the bidimensionality problem is Lee et al. 
(1993). These authors show that NYSE specialists actively manage information 
asymmetry risk by adjusting both immediacy costs (spreads) and market depth. 
The main implication is that definitive inferences about market liquidity are 
impossible analysing only immediacy costs or depth. Other papers as, for 
example, Jones and Lipson (2001) and Chordia et al.(2001), point out the 
relevance of considering both dimensions simultaneously to measure the impact 
of policy decisions and information events on liquidity.  
 
So, liquidity unambiguously changes whenever immediacy costs and depth move 
in opposite directions or one of them changes and the other one remains constant. 
In order to take into account this problem we calculate four different liquidity 
variables: 
 
i. Bid-Ask spreads: calculated as the yearly average of daily relative bid-ask 
spreads. These daily bid-ask spreads are calculated as the average of the 
best bid and ask quotes divided by their mid point. 
 
ii. Depth: is an aggregate measure of the shares available in the best level of 
the limit order book. They are calculated like relative spreads  
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iii. The Market Quality Index (MQI hereafter) proposed by Bollen and 
Whaley (1998): it is well know that depth and relative spread can be 
considered ex-ante liquidity measures. As we point out before one of the 
problems related with these measures is ambiguity. In order to avoid this 
problem different authors propose alternative measures that put together 
spreads and depths. Among the different measures we find Pascual et al 
(2004), Martinez et al (2004), or Beston et al (2000). MQI is a ratio of 
mean average Depth divided by relative spread. We use daily observations 
of both variables. Its formula is 
 
spread Relative
ask)/2at Depth   bidat (Depth +=MQI  
 
iv. The Amihud (2002) measure: this measure captures in a very simple but 
intuitive way the price impact as the response associated with one euro of 
trading volume. However we will use an alternative adjusted for market 
liquidity. 
 














 1  
 
where  and  are, respectively, the return and euro volume on day 
d in month t, and  is the number of days with observations in month t 
of stock j. When a particular stock has a high value of  it indicates 
that the price moves quite a lot in response to trading volume and, 
therefore, the stock is considered to be illiquid. It is important to point out 
that Hasbrouck (2002) finds that this measure appears to be the best among 





(2005) find that Amihud measure is the only aggregated liquidity variable 
that is priced in MSE. 




We construct one measure of volatility (VOLAT). This variable is the standard 
deviations of the daily returns for each stock on each year divided by the same 
volatility measure of the value weight index of SIBE, IBEX-35®. We calculate 
this ratio of standard deviations of daily returns of stocks relative with the IBEX-
35® to obtain idiosyncratic volatility measures relative to market volatility. 
Values of the ratio above 1 will show higher volatility than the mean average 




Size is measured by the logarithm of the market value at the 30th of June of each 
year. Bigger firms are shown by investors as less information asymmetry risky, 
because the level of information available is usually higher for this kind of firms. 
For Spanish listed stocks, López and Marhuenda (2002) provide evidence of a 
higher level of analysts’ following for bigger firms, which provide filtered and 
processed information regarding the company. Hence, we expect a positive 
relationship between our proxy for size and liquidity. 
 
iii. Effective Volume 
 
Effective Volume is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual average of 
the daily effective volume (number of shares times transaction price) of each year. 
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This list of control variables is in line with the previous literature such as Heflin et 
al. (2002) or Welker (1995). 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
 
Table 1 provides sample size and summary statistics for each year of our analysis.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
We can observe that median disclosure quality experiences a period of steady 
increase between 1993 and 1998, but then falls back to the 1995 level. Relative 
spread is non increasing almost every year (1997 is the only exception). We can 
also notice the decrease in the standard deviation of this liquidity measure. In the 
final years of the sample we can also observe a decrease in depth. MQI is 
increasing all over the sample, except for year 1999 and 2000. It is important to 
note that Amihud measure suffer an important change in the median and standard 
deviation values from the first part of the sample (1994 to 1997) relative to the 
last part (1998-2000). This change means an important increase in liquidity.  
 
In table 2 Spearman correlations coefficients are provided  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
In terms of correlations we can notice that the disclosure index is highly 
correlated with all the other variables except depth. The correlation with size and 
volume may cause a multicollinearity problem. This is the reason why we will 
orthogonalise these variables in the rest of the analysis. The high correlation 
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between disclosure and volatility provides us with a first proof that volatility can 
play a crucial role in determining the effect of disclosure on liquidity.  
 
Also, the correlations between disclosure and all the liquidity measures (except 
for depth) are all of the expected sign and significant indicating that higher 
disclosure is related with higher level of liquidity. 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
In order to test our hypothesis we will first use the following model 
 




i. LIQ is one of the 4 liquidity measures described in the previous section 
(Relative spread, Depth, MQI or ILLQ (Amihud)) 
i. DISC is the lagged index of annual report disclosure quality 
ii. RSIZE are the residuals of an OLS regression of the natural logarithm of 
the market value at the 30th of June of year t on the index of annual report 
disclosure quality of year t-1  
iii. VOLAT is the annual average of the daily standard deviation of the stock 
return divided by the annual average of the daily standard deviation of the 
return of the IBEX market index, calculated for year t 
iv. REFFEC are the residuals of an OLS regression of the natural logarithm of 
the annual average of the daily effective volume (number of shares times 
transaction price) on the natural logarithm of the market value and on the 
index of annual report disclosure quality. All the variables are calculated 
in year t. 
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The use of orthogonalised variables for size and effective volume is due to the 
willingness to avoid multicollinearity problems. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of running a simple OLS regression using the pooled 
data. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
We can see that disclosure has a positive and significant direct effect on liquidity. 
This is true for each of the four alternative liquidity measures except for Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity variable. One reason behind this non significance could be the 
differences in the variable from some years to the others. So, from these results 
we can accept hypothesis H1 because it seems that there exist a significantly 
positive relationship between disclosure quality and liquidity. 
 
However many companies appear in various years of our sample and this could 
give raise company specific effects. Moreover if we include year dummy 
variables in the same OLS regressions we find that most of them are significant.6 
This provides evidence in favour of some time dependence of the results. Both 
these problems may give raise to estimates of the parameters that can be 
inconsistent and/or inefficient.  
 
In order to take into account the possibility of company specific effects we will 
estimate the same model but with cross-section specific intercepts (fixed effects).7 
To deal with the year dependency problem we modify our dependent variable. We 
subtract from the liquidity measure for a certain company in a certain year the 
average across companies of the same liquidity measure for that particular year. 
                                                 
6 The results are available from the authors 
7 We have considered the alternative of using random effects. However the results of the 
Hausmann test on the equality of the estimates under the two methods in general are in favour of 
the fixed effect technique. Results are available from the authors. 
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These modifications should take into account the fact that part of the liquidity 
level for each firm is explained by year specific effects. 
The modified model is the following 
 
1 , 1 2
3 4
( )it t i i t it
it it it




−− = + +
+ + +     (2) 
 
where all the variables are defined as before apart from tLIQ , which is the 
average across firms of the liquidity measure for year t. Notice that now the 
intercept is company specific. The results of the estimation of this fixed effect 
model are presented in Table 4. In order to save make the presentation clearer, the 
company specific intercepts have been omitted. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
If we compare the results of table 3 with the results of table 4 we notice important 
differences. Disclosure is always significant as a determinant of liquidity, no 
matter which liquidity measures is used. However the direction of the effect of 
disclosure on liquidity depends crucially on the liquidity measures used. If we 
look at the relative spread or at the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure we see that 
higher level of disclosure imply higher level of liquidity. This is in line with the 
results of table 3 and supports hypothesis H1(a). However if we look at depth and 
at the MQI index higher level of disclosure imply lower levels of liquidity. These 
latter results contradicts the simple OLS results of table 3 and supports hypothesis 
H1(b). 
 
Overall the results of table 4 confirm the existence of a multidimensionality 
problem in the study of liquidity and support hypothesis H2, i.e. the nature of the 
relationship between disclosure and liquidity depends on the liquidity measures 
used. 
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The same is true if we look at the size variable. In the fixed effects models its sign 
is the opposite that in the standard OLS regressions when we consider depth and 
MQI. Hence also the effect of size on liquidity depends on the liquidity measures 
used. Effective volume and volatility are almost always not significant, whereas 
they were always significant in the standard OLS regressions. 
 
The final column of table 4 provides the values of the Durbin-Watson statistic. In 
the controversial cases, i.e. depth and MQI, its value is fairly low and rejects the 
hypothesis of absence of serial correlation. So the next step in our analysis is to 
re-specify the model by including an autoregressive component as follows.  
 
, 1 1 , 1 21
3 4
( ) ( )it i i t i t itt t
it it it
LIQ LIQ LIQ LIQ DISC RSIZE
VOLAT REFFEC
α δ β β
β β ε
− −−− = + − + +
+ + +   (3) 
 
Even if, according to their Durbin-Watson statistic in table 4, serial correlation did 
not seem to be a problem in the case of relative spread and Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure we run model (3) for all four liquidity measures. The results 
are provided in table 5. 
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
The inclusion of the autoregressive component in the model does not change the 
substance of the results. However it is significant in three cases out of four, 
showing the importance of taking into account the autocorrelation of liquidity in a 
yearly basis. Disclosure is always significant as a determinant of liquidity, but 
again the direction of its effect depends on the liquidity measures used. It has a 
positive effect on the relative spread and on the Amihud illiquidity measure, but it 





The recent corporate scandals on both sides of the Atlantic have brought the issue 
of transparency to the centre of the public debate on market regulation. In this 
paper we have investigated whether the quality of annual report disclosures is 
significantly related to a crucial dimension of the functioning of the stock market: 
liquidity.  
 
Using a sample of firms quoted on the Spanish Stock Exchange between 1994 and 
2000, for which we have a measure for the quality of annual report disclosures, 
we have tested the hypothesis that more transparency is associated with a higher 
level of liquidity.  
 
Our regressions show how the direction of the relationship depends crucially on 
the liquidity measures used. More transparency reduces the relative spread and the 
Amihud (2002) measure of market illiquidity, but it also reduces depth and the 
Market Quality Index proposed by Bollen and Whaley (1998). These results are in 
line with those obtained by Heflin et al. (2002) for the US market. However we 
have extended their analysis by taking into account the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure. This measure provides a representation of the price impact once we have 
normalized trade volume to one euro. With respect to this representation, our 
findings show a positive effect of disclosure on liquidity. This result is also in line 
with the findings of Heflin et al. (2002) that disclosure affects positively market 
liquidity once we control for trade size. So we can interpret our results concerning 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures as another parsimonious way of 
reconciling the contrasting evidence in terms of spread and depth and conclude 
that indeed disclosure has a positive effect on liquidity. 
 
Moreover we were able to show the importance of using an appropriate estimation 
technique when using panel data. For the two of the four liquidity measures the 
sign of the coefficient of the disclosure variable changes when we move from 
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standard OLS regressions to a fixed effect model that takes into account time 
dependence as well. So a result that would have seemed clear from standard OLS 
regressions, i.e. disclosure has a positive effect on liquidity, becomes far less clear 
when we use panel data techniques. Moreover variables that seem to play a crucial 
role as determinant of liquidity when standard OLS are used, looses their 
significance when possible company specific and year specific effects are taken 
into account. In particular this is the case of volatility that ceases to be significant.  
 
Hence the main message of our analysis is that the relationship between disclosure 
and liquidity can not be studied without taking into account two fundamental 
issues: a) the multidimensionality of the concept of liquidity and consequently the 
choice of the liquidity measures; b) the use of an econometric methodology that 
deals properly with the features of the sample used. 
 
Finally we have also shown that liquidity can have an important autoregressive 
component in a yearly basis that had not been highlighted by the previous studies. 
 
In terms of future research we believe that more theoretical work is needed in 
order to rationalise the contrasting evidence regarding spread and depth. Moreover 
the list of control variables should be extended to include a proxy for the 
composition of shareholdings. The crucial role played by this variable in 
mediating disclosure effects has already been shown by the work of Bushee and 
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Median, Standard Deviation and Number of Observations of the Variables 
 
 Years 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 Median 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.65 0.58 0.58 
Disclosure Std.Dev. 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 
 N 131 137 133 138 142 125 103 122 





1.78 1.76 1.26 1.09 1.27 0.61 0.73 
 N  120 122 130 146 154 132 134 
 Median  1.85 1.91 1.98 1.85 1.56 1.14 1.17 
Depth/1000 Std.Dev.  18.90 31.56 35.71 105.98 280.13 896.84 141.32 
 N  120 122 130 146 154 145 134 
 Median  1.65 2.24 2.32 2.51 2.04 1.69 1.72 
MQI/1000 Std.Dev.  54.59 105.45 89.23 90.31 156.96 392.32 163.38 
 N  120 122 130 146 154 132 134 
 Median  13.26 23.49 12.11 7.71 3.04 1.68 2.65 
ILLQ Std.Dev.  39.72 85.40 34.34 34.16 5.88 2.82 4.63 
 N  110 115 119 126 135 124 124 
 Median  1.10 0.49 0.44 0.88 1.09 0.88 0.69 
Volatility Std.Dev.  3.02 1.91 1.55 0.90 1.58 1.39 2.09 
 N  117 123 122 130 137 142 145 





104.37 155.63 258.98 494.41 721.18 1040.26 1194.51 
 N  120 122 130 146 154 145 134 
 Median  10.51 10.58 10.70 11.11 11.27 11.01 11.13 
LnMkvalue Std.Dev.  1.58 1.64 1.70 1.63 1.61 1.72 1.72 
 N  106 108 115 125 119 130 134 
NOTES: Relative Spreads are calculated as the yearly average of the daily relative spreads. Depth 
is an aggregated measure of the number of shares available in the best level of the limit order 
book. MQI is the mean average depth divided by relative spread. We use daily observations of 
both variables. ILLQ captures the price impact as the response associated with one euro of trading 
volume. It is defined as the average of the stock returns divided by the effective volume. DISC is 
the index of quality of disclosure. VOLAT is the standard deviation of daily stock returns for each 
stock, divided by the same volatility measure of the value weight index of SIBE, IBEX-35®. 
Effective Volume is measured by the natural logarithm of the annual average of the daily effective 






SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
 
 ILLQ MQI LnMkvalue LnEffec Depth Volat Spread 
MQI -0.67 
(0.00)*** 





























































NOTES: Relative Spreads are calculated as the yearly average of the daily relative spreads. Depth 
is an aggregated measure of the number of shares available in the best level of the limit order 
book. MQI is the mean average depth divided by relative spread. We use daily observations of 
both variables. ILLQ captures the price impact as the response associated with one euro of trading 
volume. It is defined as the average of the stock returns divided by the effective volume. DISC is 
the lagged index of quality of disclosure for period 1993 to 1999. VOLAT is the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns for each stock, divided by the same volatility measure of the value 
weight index of SIBE, IBEX-35®. Effective Volume is measured by the natural logarithm of the 
annual average of the daily effective volume (number of shares times transaction price). 
  
*Statistically significant at a 10% level 
** Statistically significant at a 5% level 





itititittiit REFFECVOLATRSIZEDISCLIQ εββββα +++++= − 4321,1  
 (p-value in brackets) 
 
Dependent 
Variable n Intercept DISC RSIZE VOLAT REFFEC 
Adj.R2 
F-statistic 













































NOTES: LIQ. Is one of our four proxies of liquidity/illiquidity (Relative Spread, depth, MQI ratio or 
Amihud). Bid-ask spread are calculated as the yearly average of the daily relative bid-ask spreads. Depth is an 
aggregated measure of the number of shares available in the best level of the limit order book. MQI is the 
mean average depth divided by relative spread. We use daily observations of both variables. ILLQ captures 
the price impact as the response associated with one euro of trading volume. It is defined as the monthly 
average ratio of absolute return and euro volume. DISC is our lagged proxy for obtained for each year from 
1993 to 1999. RSIZE is our proxy for firm size, obtained from the residuals of the regression of size 
(Lnmkvalue) on disclosure, so that we include an orthogonalised variable in order to avoid a multicollinearity 
problem. VOLAT is the standard deviations of daily stock returns for each stock on each year, divided by the 
same volatility measure of the value weight index of SIBE, IBEX-35®. REFFEC is our proxy for firm trading 
activity, obtained from the residuals of the regression of the natural logarithm of the annual average of daily 
effective volume on the natural logarithm of market value and disclosure, in order to obtain an orthogonalised 
variable and avoid again multicollinearity.  
 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level 

 TABLE 4 
 FIXED EFFECTS 
 
itititittiitit REFFECVOLATRSIZEDISCLIQLIQ εββββα +++++=− − 4321,1)(
 
(p-value in brackets) 
 
Dependent 














































NOTES: LIQ. Is one of our four proxies of liquidity/illiquidity (Relative Spread, depth, MQI ratio or 
Amihud). Bid-ask spread are calculated as the yearly average of the daily relative bid-ask spreads. Depth is an 
aggregated measure of the number of shares available in the best level of the limit order book. MQI is the 
mean average depth divided by relative spread. We use daily observations of both variables. ILLQ captures 
the price impact as the response associated with one euro of trading volume. It is defined as the monthly 
average ratio of absolute return and euro volume. LIQ is the average of the liquidity measure across firms 
for each year. DISC is our lagged proxy for obtained for each year from 1993 to 1999. RSIZE is our proxy for 
firm size, obtained from the residuals of the regression of size (Lnmkvalue) on disclosure, so that we include 
an orthogonalised variable in order to avoid a multicollinearity problem. VOLAT is the standard deviations of 
daily stock returns for each stock on each year, divided by the same volatility measure of the value weight 
index of SIBE, IBEX-35®. REFFEC is our proxy for firm trading activity, obtained from the residuals of the 
regression of the natural logarithm of the annual average of daily effective volume on the natural logarithm of 
market value and disclosure, in order to obtain an orthogonalised variable and avoid again multicollinearity. 
 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level 
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NOTES: LIQ. Is one of our four proxies of liquidity/illiquidity (Relative Spread, depth, MQI ratio or 
Amihud). Bid-ask spread are calculated as the yearly average of the daily relative bid-ask spreads. Depth is an 
aggregated measure of the number of shares available in the best level of the limit order book. MQI is the 
mean average depth divided by relative spread. We use daily observations of both variables. ILLQ captures 
the price impact as the response associated with one euro of trading volume. It is defined as the monthly 
average ratio of absolute return and euro volume. LIQ is the average of the liquidity measure across firms 
for each year. DISC is our lagged proxy for obtained for each year from 1993 to 1999. RSIZE is our proxy for 
firm size, obtained from the residuals of the regression of size (Lnmkvalue) on disclosure, so that we include 
an orthogonalised variable in order to avoid a multicollinearity problem. VOLAT is the standard deviations of 
daily stock returns for each stock on each year, divided by the same volatility measure of the value weight 
index of SIBE, IBEX-35®. REFFEC is our proxy for firm trading activity, obtained from the residuals of the 
regression of the natural logarithm of the annual average of daily effective volume on the natural logarithm of 
market value and disclosure, in order to obtain an orthogonalised variable and avoid again multicollinearity. 
 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
** Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
 
 APPENDIX  
 
Our key independent variable is a measure of the quality of the companies’ 
annual report disclosures produced by a well known business magazine 
("Actualidad Económica"). The following is the list of the items considered 
by the magazine while computing the score.  
 
The President's Letter: If it is signed during the first quarter of the year, it 
gets one point. The contents of the letter may be awarded up to 5 points if a 
clear definition of the company’s strategy is outlined. (Scale: from 0 to 6 
points).  
Historical Data: 2 points if the main data for year t-2 of the profit and loss 
account and of the balance-sheet appear. 4 points if those for year t-3 are 
also included, and 6 if those for year t-4 appear as well. (Scale: from 0 to 6 
points).  
Basic Data: 8 points if a summary of the main data of the accounts, 
financial ratios and market ratios appear. Both the quantity and the quality 
of the data are evaluated. (Scale: From 0 to 8 points).  
Analysis of results: Full analysis of the operations, mean total assets, 
quarterly results analysis of year t compared to year t-1 are given up to 6 
points. If only data for year t are included, 4 points are given. (Scale: from 0 
to 6 points).  
The Management’s Report: 6 points, if all legally required information is 
included: i.e., the evolution of the business and of the current situation of 
the company, events that occurred after the closing of the audit, the 
evolution of the company, its purchases of its own shares and R+D 
activities. The clarity and the quantity of the information is awarded up to 
12 points. (From 0 to 12 points).  
Order and Clarity: the clarity, conciseness and precision of the language 
are valued here, as well as whether the information follows a logical order. 
(From 0 to 3 points).  
 
 Design: The quality of the design and its graphics and pictures. (From 0 to 2 
points).  
Affiliates: Two points for information about the activity, home, 
participation, own funds and results of different affiliates. 4 points if the 
dividends received by the affiliates and their book-values are included. 6 
points if the accounts are included. (From 0 to 6 points).  
Segmental reporting: Break-down of the business by categories of 
activities and geographical markets. A complete analysis of the contribution 
to the overall results for each of these areas is rewarded with 4 points. (From 
0 to 4 points).  
The Audit: 4 points for audits without qualifications, 2 for those that 
contain qualifications and zero if the auditor indicates limitations or reserves 
his opinion. The cost of the audit is evaluated on a 2-point scale. (From 0 to 
6 points).  
Shareholders: 2 points if it gives information about the shareholders who 
hold more than 10% of the firm’s total stock. 4 points if the percentage of 
total capital is specified, and 6 if any additional information is included. 
(From 0 to 6 points).  
Board of Directors: 2 points for information on the shares held by the 
board. 4 points if the participation of some of its members is also specified, 
and 6 if it is detailed. (From 0 to 6 points).  
Directors’ Remuneration: If there is global information on the total 
remuneration 2 points are given. 4 points if there is a breakdown. 6 points if 
the breakdown of Directors’ remuneration is done nominally. (From 0 to 6 
points).  
Stock options plans: A description of the plans, beneficiaries, conditions, 
cost to the company and other characteristics. To achieve the maximum 
points, the options granted to their executives and directors must be broken-
down by individual. (From 0 to 4 points).  
Other Information: up to 4 points are granted to companies that offer 
excellent information on their true situation. The degree of concentration of 
sales and suppliers; their market-share; a market analysis; the volume of 
 
 distribution channels, or, information on either quality or environmental 
initiatives, are some of the items considered here. (From 0 to 4 points).  
On-line Information: The inclusion of the annual report in the company’s 
web page is evaluated on a two-point scale. If quarterly reports are also 
included it is added 2 more points. (From 0 to 4 points).  
Good Policy Norms: A complete and detailed declaration of the firm’s 
norms and policies. To achieve the maximum points, the company must 
explain to what degree it has managed to implement the recommendations 
included in the Spanish good governance ("Olivencia") Report. (From 0 to 5 
points).  
Evolution of the Market: 3 points if information is included on the 
evolution of the interest-rate, recruiting volume and days of trading. 4 if 
market ratios are included. 5 if the rate is compared to the general Stock 
Market index or the Ibex35, and 6 if it also includes the sector’s index. 
(From 0 to 6 points). 
 
 
